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Abstract: The evolution of the Western world has drawn on theoretical structures of classical and 
neoclassical liberalism for its explanatory support and sources of inspiration for centuries. Against this 
ideological background, institutionalists aim at showing that growth is a process of transformation, a double 
change: an economic and an institutional one. In this analysis, our purpose is to highlight the importance of 
informal  institutional  arrangements  and  their  quality  in  explaining  the  disparities  of  revenues  and 
developments between countries. In our approach, we will consider several indicators meant to highlight 
various aspects of research. The approach proposed is a transversal-comparative one and static methods 
pertain to uni- and multivariate analysis. The results obtained suggest the existence of major differences within 
the Central and East European area as far as informal institutions are concerned; moreover, the analysis 
conducted confirms the existence of a significant relation between the level of development and the structure 
of informal arrangements such as: trust level, bribe culture and corruption control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Reform programmes in Central and Eastern Europe were mainly based on recommendations 
provided by international bodies consisting of: the adherence to monetary policies meant to reduce 
existing disequilibria, price liberalisation, economic openness to overseas, stimulation of private 
companies, set up and privatisation of state companies, the elimination of state control, reformation 
of the legislative system, rule of law, etc. All these transformations, adaptations and changes of the 
system deeply affected ideologies, values, human relationships, etc. Every country has created a 
certain institutional structure according to shared values, beliefs and ideologies at a given time. 
                                                           
*  Faculty  of  Economics  and  Business  Administration,  Alexandru  Ioan  Cuza  University  of  Iasi,  Romania,  e-
mail:yolandadr3i@yahoo.com. 
†  Faculty  of  Economics  and  Business  Administration,  Alexandru  Ioan  C uza  University  of  Iasi,  Romania,   e-
mail:clau_tiganas@yahoo.com. 
‡ Department of Teacher Education and Training, Gheorghe Asachi Technical University of Iasi, Romania , e-mail: 
filipeanu@hotmail.com.  
 
 
CES Working Papers – Volume V, Issue 4 
 
 
655 
However,  as  some  countries  efficiently  adjusted  to  new  changes,  others  “statically  enclosed 
themselves within the initial project or were politically imposed a dysfunctional and disarticulated 
system which did not fit their beliefs of development”. (Pohoata, 2009, p. 293) Consequently, post-
communist changes affect more than the social organisation, ideologies, inter-human relations, values 
and ways of doing things in depth. Changes were inherent as a part of natural evolution even though 
they were not always a sign of social progress. “The path followed by post-communist societies is 
meant  to  redefine  modernity  locally,  to  complete  the  process  of  modernisation  and  relative 
globalisation by adopting tendencies from the Western world (either by imitation, contagion or 
planned changes). Transition is the stage of major changes, having a new societal order as macro 
social product”. (Voicu, 2005, p.23) Of all Central and Eastern European countries studied, Hungary 
and Poland experienced partial economic reforms during 1968-1989 in the sense of decentralisation 
of their economies (increase of enterprise autonomy, partial price liberalisation, etc.) (Ciobotaru, 
2009, p.11) All these short-term measures did not improve considerably the performances of the two 
countries,  shaped  mentalities  and  economic  behaviours  of  population,  preparing  them  for  a 
competitive economy. As a result, the process of transformation, creation and adaptation occurred in 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and it was a successful one based on 
healthy institutional arrangements. To Romania, the change of political regime, i.e. of the communist 
institutions of that time to democracy and freedom did not suffice. The lack of efficient institutions, 
a high level of corruption, low self-esteem are only a few of the specific traits of this country. Time 
is needed for these individual values to find their pace. In the period following the transition from an 
ordered economy to a market one, Romania went through a decade of instability and economic 
decline. Against the legislative background, transition was characterised by various tensions: on the 
one hand, owing to the need for existence of a powerful state, capable of dealing with new challenges 
and, on the other hand, the need to limit its power. The velocity in applying new regulations created 
an appropriate context for a less transparent affirmation of interest groups. The absence of institutions 
or their weak representation led to opportunist and corrupt behaviours. The business environment 
thus became one in which the alliance between the state as bureaucratic body and an exclusive 
category of elites governed.  
It is widely acknowledged that formal institutions alone cannot influence human behaviour, yet 
its largest part can be explained by means of informal institutions rooted in the culture of a society 
and  drawing  on  it.  However,  this  aspect  has  been  neglected  so  far.  This  is  because  informal  
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institutions cannot be identified, measured or quantified easily. Unofficial constraints have a much 
more complex character as they “necessarily contain features that render the exchange viable by 
reducing the costs incurred by measurement and constraint”. (North, 1990, p. 42) Consequently, 
formal institutions are the source for cutting costs; in other words, institutions not only influence the 
big picture, but also how it is divided into various groups and people in society which should base 
their relations on trust. Ergo, we strongly claim that the macroeconomic environment of a state is 
stimulated by the degree of trust between individuals and institutions. In this respect, Zak and Knack 
highlight the fact that trust in a country depends on five primary factors: per capita income, income 
distribution, government efficiency, social cohesion and education. In their model, trust is associated 
with aggregated time which agents did not spend to check others’ actions. Trust is a product of both 
formal institutions and social homogeneity along with informal sanctions on cheaters. Their analysis 
proves that trust and social and institutional factors affecting it have an influence on growth rates.       
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
For this approach, we aimed at taking into account various indicators meant to emphasise 
various aspects of research. Our approach is a transversal-comparative one and static methods are 
specific to the uni- and multivariate analysis. The geographical area of interest involves all member 
states of Central and Eastern Europe. Economic evolution in the region was unequal, some countries 
being  more  successful  than  others.  Thus,  Romania,  Bulgaria,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  recorded  a 
significant decline during the first years of transition. For the other states, recovery was much quicker. 
In order to explain the situation of Central and East European countries, we aim at confirming or 
infirming the following hypotheses:     
??: Hypothesis 1. Trust, corruption control and bribe culture do not influence a country’s level of 
development;  
?1: Hypothesis 2. Trust, corruption control and bribe culture influence a country’s level of 
development.  
These hypotheses will be tested by means of a multiple regression model, namely:Y= ʱ+
 +….+ +…..+  + ξ,where Y is the dependent or explanatory variable, the level of per 
capita income in PPS; are independent variables, where i = 1, n;   - trust level;   - corruption 
control;   - bribe culture; ξ is a residual variable; ʱ,  are regression coefficients.  
 
 
CES Working Papers – Volume V, Issue 4 
 
 
657 
3. RESULTS  
 
Table 1.1 shows the values of the correlation report (R) and determination report. As can be 
seen, the 0.829 value for R and 0.795 for 𝑹𝛐 show us that there is a linear, direct relation between the 
dependant variable and the independent ones.   
Table 1.1 - Assessed values of the correlation report and determination report  
Model Summary 
Model  R  R Square  Adjusted R Square  Std. Error of the Estimate 
1  .892a  .795  .693  6.83274 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Trust, corruputioncontrol and bribe  
b. Dependent Variable: GDP per capita in PPS 
Tabelul 1.2 - ANOVA  
ANOVA 
Model  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  Sig. 
1  Regression  1088.782  3  362.927  7.774  .017a 
Residual  280.118  6  46.686     
Total  1368.900  9       
a. Predictors: (Constant),  Trust, corrupution control and bribe 
b. Dependent Variable: GDP per capita in PPS 
 
To test the significance of the correlation report, we used two hypotheses:  : ŋ = 0 – the value 
of the correlation report is null and  : ŋ  0 – the value of the correlation report is significantly 
different from zero, which shows that there is a statistical relation between variables. For the model 
above, the calculated value of the statistical test F is: 
 
 =  =  = 7.774 
 
 
The calculated value of statistical F is higher than the theoretical value which proves that 
hypothesis  is rejected and   is accepted. We may guarantee that the value of the correlation 
report is significantly different from zero to an extent of 95% probability. Moreover, this also holds 
true  for  the  probability  value  associated  with  test  statistic  when  compared  to  the  level  of  the 
significance threshold chosen (ʱ = 0.05). Further to the mentions above, we can see that there is a  
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strong statistical relation between the level of development measured by per capita income in PPS, 
trust level, corruption control and bribe culture. 
Table 1.3 - Assessments of parameters in the multiple regression model 
 
Model –Informal institutions/Level of development 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Method 
 
Trust 
 
Control of corruption 
 
Bribe  
 
GDP per capita in PPS 
 
 OLS Regression 
 
1.345 
 
0.252 
  -0.617 
 
In the model above, all assessed values of the R correlation report are 0.892 and R square 0.795 
for the determination report, respectively. This points out that simultaneous variation of independent 
variables explains the variation of dependent variable to an extent of 79.5%. From the conducted 
analysis, we may notice that positive values of regression coefficients point out the positive influence 
of trust level and corruption control variables on the level of development. 
To check the work hypothesis, we can use the graph achieved by means of regression residuals 
diagram. (see Figure 1.1)  
 
Figure 1.1 - Regression residuals diagrams: trust level and corruption control 
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The diagrams above highlight the fact that error distribution abides by a normal law as the 
points represented by the values of errors are located near the straight line in the square line.    
 
 
Figure 1.2 - Trust level/ development level measured by GDP in PPS 
 
Figure 1.3 - Corruption control/ development level measured by GDP in PPS
 
Studies in the literature of the field prove us that formations built in the context of a high level 
of mutual trust reached higher levels of performance than conflictual societies. Robert Putnam (1993), 
in his Making Democracy Work, underlines the fact that economic performance is predicted by the  
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degree  of  spontaneous  association  between  individuals.  “Trust  implies  the  existence  of  mutual 
relations of acceptance between individuals and institutions so as to prevent or solve conflicts and 
contribute to an easier interaction. In the absence of trust, contracts are harder to enforce, caution is 
required, as well as longer negotiation periods and serious causes for conflicts, not to mention that 
the risk factor often raises contract price over usual production costs.” (Popescu, Pohoata, 2007, 
p.201) Fukuyama (1995) seizes the importance of property rights, law and contract as fundamentals 
in the efficient operation of institutions, yet all these need to be accompanied by trust, mutual help 
and moral obligations. As the author underlines, “all procedures that substitute trust lead to higher 
transaction costs. Put differently, the fact that trust prevails in society means that an additional tax 
should be introduced for all types of economic activity, a tax which is absent in societies with a higher 
trust  level”.  (Fukuyama,  1995,  p.148)  Therefore,  minimum  impediments  in  exchange  are  an 
institutional  feature  that  stimulates  economic  growth  and  development.  Such  an  institutional 
arrangement allows us to follow a durable path that leads to economic performance.           
   
4. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
  The analysis conducted (see Figure I.2 and Figure I.3) shows that countries such as the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Poland recorded the highest trust levels and corruption control. The trust of 
economic agents in informal institutions, legislative discipline, transparency of the decisional process 
are only some of the feature of the aforementioned countries. Romania still bears the marks of the 
past. The communist regime created structural stimulants to engage in large scale corrupt behaviours, 
deeply rooted in the culture of our country to this day. The great problem of our country pertains to 
the existence of a system that lacks transparency in decision making and in efficient instruments for 
monitoring, evaluating and controlling activities. As a result, countries with weak institutions are 
incapable to sanction spoiling behaviour accordingly and cannot prevent power abuses, bribery and 
costs incurred by actions with a higher corruption level.   
The minus regression coefficient is bribe culture which points to us the negative relation 
between this indicator and the level of development. Industrial regulations, tax laws, supply problems, 
the introduction of new technologies or, in other words, the amount of opportunistic behaviour are 
determined by the nature of formal and informal institutions and how they are correlated. For instance, 
in countries with an unstable legislative system and where opportunistic behaviour is not sanctioned  
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accordingly,  the  institutional  environment  is  dominated  by  bribery  and  corruption.  Offering 
expensive gifts to Chinese officials during transactions is a rule hard to digest in most Western or 
developed countries where free competition requires an impartial behaviour from the part of officials. 
Employment practices within public organisations are another instance of the sort. Here, unwritten 
employment laws for personnel based on kinship and not professional proficiency is another way of 
circumventing formal rules created to ensure a competitive labour market in the public sector.    
Considering the fact that Sig. value < 0.05 for all the three variables analysed, we can conclude 
that, up to a probability of 95%, the level of development depends on informal institutions operating 
in a society.          
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